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by JACK R. ALTON*
The history of the special verdict in English and early Ameri-
can law has been adequately discussed in other articles and will not
be considered here.' We are concerned with the present practice in
Ohio, and the law as it now exists on the subject.
At the outset a distinction should be drawn between the special
verdict and the interrogatory. Much of the difficulty in the use and
evaluation of special verdicts arises from a failure to maintain this
distinction. "A special verdict is one by which the jury finds facts
only as established by the evidence; and it must so present such
facts, but not the evidence to prove them, that nothing remains for
the Court but to draw from the facts found conclusions of law."
2
Such a verdict is mandatory when requested by either party.3 The
statute on the interrogatory reads as follows: "When either party
requests it, the Court shall instruct the Jurors, if they render a
general verdict, specially to find upon particular questions of fact,
to be stated in writing, and shall direct a written finding there-
on... ."4 Both procedures require facts to be found. The basic differ-
ence is that the special interrogatory is used to test a general ver-
dict, while a special verdict is the entire verdict of the jury.
THE REQuEsT, AwD DRAFTnG THE FoRmS.
While the earlier cases required a prescribed form to be used
in requesting a special verdict,5 the present practice does not re-
quire any such formality.6 Likewise there is no definite time
at which the request must be made. It may even be made after
special charges to the jury have been given.7 However, it seems
obvious that it should be made before the arguments begin since
comments on questions of law would otherwise undoubtedly be
made by counsel and would be improper. There is no requirement
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that opposing counsel or the court be notified in advance of the re-
quest. However, propriety may require that counsel apprise the
court so that the court's time will not be wasted preparing a gen-
eral charge. As will be seen later, the charge is considerably short-
ened in the special verdict case. It may also be wise to advise op-
posing counsel sufficiently in advance of the request in order to
allow a form to be prepared, since if this is not done the court will
undoubtedly recess to allow time for preparations.
There is no requirement that written forms be presented when
the request is made.8 However, it is certainly the practice for the
party making the request to have a form prepared. One of the de-
fensive measures when a request is made by opposing counsel may
be to allow the case to go to the jury on the proponent's form
alone. In two recent unreported trials, the jury changed the pro-
ponent's form in one case, destroying its effect, and in the other
case the judge submitted a form opposed to the proponent's form,
which the jury signed.
The verdict may be in narrative or interrogatory form.9 The
interrogatory form has been preferred by some courts.'0 Recent
practice is to use the narrative form, possibly because each form
is a written argument in favor of the draftsman's side of the case,
and if signed it will usually sustain a judgment. One court sug-
gested an interrogatory on each issue in the case.1 This, however,
cuts down on the jury's opportunity to review the various argu-
ments contained in narrative forms submitted by counsel. An
eminent writer has suggested that the pleadings be so drafted
that they may be sent to the jury room and signed by the jury
as their special verdict.12 This is not the practice here. The plaintiff
drafting a special verdict in narrative form may include all the
facts which he thinks have been proven in one form, or he may
make up one special verdict based upon each specification of
negligence. One method of the defendant is to state a few basic
facts and conclude by saying that one party has not proved his
case by a preponderance of the evidence.'3 A favorite of the de-
fendant is to enumerate the conduct of both parties, the facts of
which will justify a finding of negligence, and state that the con-
duct of both was the concurring or proximate cause, which will
require the court to find for the defendant. Undoubtedly the nar-
rative form is the preference of lawyers since it gives an advantage
InLd. Comm. v. Weaver, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 448 (1933).
9 fDowd-Feder v. Schreyer, 124 Ohio St. 504, 179 N.E. 411 (1932).
10 Gendler v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 18 Ohio App. 48 (1923).
lGendler v. Cleveland Ry. Co., supra.
12 Sunderland, Verdicts, General & Special, 29 YALE L. J. 253, 258 (1920).
13 Hubbard v. C.C.C. Highways, Inc., supra.
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to the clever draftsman. The most important point in drafting
special verdicts is to use facts only-never insert a conclusion of
law.
T M CoURT'S CHARGE
After the request has been made and the form prepared and
presented to the court, the case is argued to the jury. Prior to
argument, special charges may have been requested and made by
the court. This does not preclude a party's right to a special ver-
dict.' 4 However, a requested special charge on the law of the case,
followed by a request for special verdict, should give the court
sufficient basis to refuse the special verdict. The court, in charging
the jury, is to give ". . . only such instructions... as are necessary
to enable the jury clearly to understand their duties relative to
such special verdict."'I5 The instructions should be given on the
issues in the case, the rules for weighing the evidence, and the
burden of proof. It is improper to instruct the jury upon legal
principles.' The authorities cited above do not require a charge
upon proximate cause. Recently considerable question has arisen
among lawyers and trial judges as to whether the court should
charge upon proximate cause. Certainly to sustain a judgment for
the plaintiff there must be facts from which proximate cause may
be found. However, in view of the fact that it is not always neces-
sary to find upon the question of proximate cause, 1 it would seem
that a charge giving the legal definition of proximate cause is not
necessary. Furthermore, the jury need not use the exact words
"proximate cause" so long as their intention is obvious.' 8 However,
whether proximate cause is defined or not, the court should still
state that "the cause" is one of the issues in the case. If the court
uses the term "proximate" cause in defining the issues, then the
term should be defined.
The court should not charge upon negligence or other matters
of substantive law. 19 To do so is to vitiate the very object of the
special verdict, which is to allow the jury to find upon the issues
of fact without being burdened by matters of law. Charges on
negligence have been justfied on the basis that it was done in the
Dowd-Feder case and was excused in that case upon the basis that
the charge was correct and not prejudicial. However, this is not
the law of the Dowd-Feder case and is certainly contrary to the
14 Hubbard v. C.C.C. Highways, Inc. supra.
1sDowd-Feder v. Schreyer, spra.16Dowd-Feder v. Schreyer, supra; Gendler v. Cleveland Ry., supra.
17 Hubbard v. C.C.C. Highways, Inc., supra; Looker v. Martin, 61 Ohio L.
Abs. 373 (1952).1 Smith v. Dawson, No. 176380, Franklin Co. Common Pleas.
19 Dowd-Feder v. Schreyer, supra; Gendler v. Cleveland Ry., supra,
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syllabus. Another reason given for charging upon the law is that
counsel have put conclusions of law in their submitted forms. This
is some justification since if legal matters are to be presented to
the jury they should be defined. However, there is a better ap-
proach to the problem which will be discussed later.
Should the court charge upon ordinary care? The answer
should hinge upon whether ordinary care is a matter of fact or a
matter of law. There is authority for charging on the question and
for allowing the term to remain in a special verdict.20 However,
the exact question was not raised in the cited case. The only case
found upon this question is a well reasoned trial court decision
which holds that "ordinary care" is a legal conclusion.21 Therefore,
the court should not charge on the question. The problem can be
solved by the insertion in the special verdict form of the definition
of ordinary care. Thus "the plaintiff used the same degree of care
that average, reasonable, prudent persons would have used under
the same or similar circumstances," should not require a charge
by the court upon the question and should not be stricken from the
verdict as a legal conclusion.22
SUBmrInwG THE FoRsuvS TO THE JURY
There is no limit on the number of forms of narrative verdict
which may be submitted. In Franklin County as many as thirteen
have been given to the jury. Likewise, there is no limit on the num-
ber of questions in the interrogatory form.23 Some courts submit
every form without examination. Others make it a practice to sub-
mit their own form in every case. One of the early cases suggested
that trial courts carefully scrutinize the forms.2 A very recent
appellate court case has affirmed a trial judge's action in submit-
ting the court's own form where one set of forms contained con-
clusions of law.25 The judge also submitted the forms containing
the legal conclusions.
CoxTENTs NEcEssARY To SUSTAIN JUDGEMENT.
In order to sustain judgement, a jury must find facts consti-
tuting negligence, proximate cause, and damages. 26 The facts found
should be based upon the allegations in the pleadings and the issues
outlined in the court's charge. It is not necessary that the jury find
upon all the issues in the case.2T Thus if the facts found justify a
20 Smith v. Pa. R I, 59 Ohio L. Abs. 282, 99 NX. 2d 501 (1950).
2 Forbes v. Douglass, No. 179678, Franklin Co. Court of Common Pleas.
2 2 Jackson v. Becker, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 397 (1937).
23 Miller v. Jackson, 92 Ohio App. 199, 107 NXE. 2d 922 (1951).
24 Gendler v. Cleveland Ry., supra.
2S Klarman v. Snyder Trucking Co., No. 4844, Court of Appeals, Franklin
Co., Ohio (1953).
26 29 0. Jum. 477.
27 Noseda v. Delmul, 123 Ohio St. 647, 176 N.E. 571 (1931).
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judgment for the defendant, it is not necessary to find upon proxi-
mate cause, since such a finding is only necessary where the facts
justify a judgment for the plaintiff. 28 Also, it is not necessary to find
upon contributory negligence where the facts found require a judg-
ment for plaintiff.29 This is especially true where a form submitted
by the losing party contained a finding on that issue favorable to
him, which the jury rejected.30 Conclusions of law in the special
verdict are to be disregarded, and if sufficient facts are found omit-
ting the conclusions, judgment will still be rendered upon the ver-
dict.3' If the jury finds upon proximate cause, it is probably not
necessary that it use those exact words, but any words indicating
a direct causal relationship are sufficient.32 As was indicated above,
the use of the term "ordinary care," without the facts upon which
the term is based is a legal conclusion.33 Any matters essential to
judgment which have been stipulated or agreed to during the trial
should be included in the special verdict, since the record cannot
be examined.3 4
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
Upon the jury's return the special verdict is read in the same
manner as a general verdict. However, judgment must be rendered
by the court. It may be done almost at once, or after submission
of briefs. In order to preserve the record, counsel should move for
judgment upon the verdict after it has been returned. The case is
then in the court's hands. The court must look at the pleadings
and the special verdict and render judgment. The evidence should
not be considered since the jury has already made its findings
based upon the evidence.3 5 The question has been raised of the
court's power to set aside a verdict upon the basis that it is against
the weight of the evidence. A common pleas judge has recently done
this and the case may go to the court of appeals. Since the court
has this power when a general verdict is rendered, it can be argued
that the same power should exist in a special verdict case. How-
ever, the Supreme Court has said that the trial judge should not
consider the evidence in rendering judgment.36 Therefore, it ap-
pears that a trial judge has no power under existing law to set
aside a special verdict as being against the manifest weight of the
28 Hubbard v. C.C.C. Highways, Inc., supra.
29 Mercurio v. Hughes & Looker, No. 267, Court of Appeals, Fayette Co.,
Ohio (1951).
30 Ibid.
3 1 Noseda v. Delmul, supra..
3 2 Smith v. Dawson, supra.
3 3 Sparks v. Sims, supra; Forbes v. Douglass, supra.
3 4 Pa. P B. v. Vitt, 1U Ohio St. 670, 146 NX. 94 (1925).
35 Ib; Dowd-Feder v. Schreyer, supra.
3 6 Ibid.
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evidence. What can be done under the present law is to carefully
scrutinize each verdict before submission to the jury. It is at this
point that the trial judge has the greatest power and discretion.
After the verdict is returned, his function is narrowly limited.
Therefore, the judge should not submit a form which does not fairly
reflect the evidence presented by one side or which contains con-
clusions of law. If there is sufficient evidence to go to a jury on
an issue, then that issue should appear in the special verdict forms.
By this examination prior to submission, any form signed by the
jury will sustain judgment and the trial court need not concern
itself with whether the verdict is against the weight of the evi-
dence.
The jury may refuse to sign any form submitted and draft its
own verdict, as was done in the case of Looker v. Martin.37 The
jury found that "both parties were negligent" and that the plaintiff
had not "conclusively proved" the facts basic to his case. The trial
court rendered judgment for the defendant and the appellate court
ordered a new trial because of the conclusion of law and the higher
degree of proof required by the jury. This poses the problem of
what the court should do when a jury returns its own verdict which
is obviously defective. It can order a new trial at once or instruct
the jury further and return them for deliberation. In order to ex-
pedite the disposition of cases, every effort should be made to ob-
tain a special verdict which is legally sufficient before ordering a
new trial.
Suppose the jury returns two special verdicts, one of which
supports the plaintiff and the other the defendant. Suppose fur-
ther that one verdict contains conclusions of law without suffici-
ent additional facts to sustain judgment. Should a new trial be
ordered, or should judgment be entered on the verdict which is
legally sufficient? These questions may be answered in a pending
appeal.38
Once the court has decided on its judgment, it is not necessary
that it recite its legal conclusions in the entry of judgment Merely
entering the judgment for a party is a sufficient indication that the
court has found the law to be in his favor.39
APPEAL
After judgment, a motion for new trial may be filed. The steps
for appeal are the same as in all other cases. However, the record
need not be printed if the only question concerns the sufficiency of
the special verdict and the judgment entered thereon.40 If a motion
37 61 Ohio L. Abs. 373, 104 N.E. 2d 698 (1951).38 Burchett v. Cussins & Fearn, Court of Appeals, Muskingurm Co.
39 Mercurio v. Hughes & Looker, supra.
40 Dowd-Feder v. Schreyer, supra.
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for new trial has been sustained before or after rendering judg-
ment, then the only basis for appeal is that the court's action was
an abuse of discretiom4 ' However, there is authority that refusing
to render judgment when the special verdict requires it is an abuse
of discretion.42
CONCLUSION
The foregoing may have indicated that a great deal of doubt
pervades the field of special verdicts. According to the better rea-
soned authorities the present law is:
1. A special verdict is mandatory when requested by either
side.43
2. The forms presented may be narrative or interrogatory.44
3. The trial court should carefully scrutinize the forms pre-
sented and should reject any which will not sustain judg-
ment or which contain conclusions of law. 45
4. The court should charge only on such matters as are neces-
sary to enable the jury clearly to understand their duties
relative to the special verdict.46
5. The court should render judgment upon the pleadings and
special verdict without referring to the evidence in the rec-
ord, disregarding any legal conclusions contained in the ver-
dict.47
In spite of the foregoing authorities, the practice has deviated
considerably. Forms have been sent to the jury indiscriminately
without examination. Charges upon the law, both general and
special, have been given in special verdict cases. The evidence dur-
ing the trial has been re-examined to determine the validity of a
special verdict. Forms presented by each side have been rejected
for no reason, and the court has sent its own special verdict in
interrogatory form to the jury. All of this indicates the need for
clarification upon the subject. There is a case in the Supreme Court
for decision upon the merits which may answer some of the prob-
lems concerning special verdicts.48 The trial court had entered
judgment upon a special verdict which contained the following
statements:
1. "Defendant could and should, in the exercise of ordinary
4 1 Globe Indemnity Co. v. Schmitt, 77 Ohio App. 413, 68 N.XF_ 2d 130 (1946).
42 Tid.
43 OHIO GEN. CODE § 11420-16.
44 Dowd-Feder v. Schreyer, upra.
4 5 Gendler v. Cleveland Ry., supra.
4 6 Dowd-Feder v. Schreyer, supra.
471hiZ.
4 8 Landon v. Lee Motors, No. 33478, certified by the Court of Appeals for
Lucas Co., Ohio.
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care, have ascertained that said kingpin was broken and
should have repaired the same."
2. "Defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in said par-
ticulars."
3. "Each of the foregoing acts and omissions of the defendant
constituted negligence."
4. "Plaintiff himself was not negligent."
The court of appeals reversed the trial court on these grounds:
1. Erroneous charges on the subject of damages.
2. Failing to charge on the liability of defendant.
3. Submitting the plaintiff's special verdict form to the jury.
The first finding of error was based on the fact that the trial
court started his charge on damages with the words "when you
compute damages...," rather than the usual "if you find in favor
of the plaintiff you may then proceed,... etc." The second ground
is based upon the reasoning that since the court charged upon the
subject of negligence it should have proceeded to charge fully on
the the substantive law regarding the liability of the defendant. The
reasoning here is similar to that in the Klarman" case. Both cases
excuse charging upon the law by blaming it on the party who in-
serted the conclusions of law in his special verdict forms. The sim-
pler procedure would be to require counsel to delete the objec-
tionable material from the verdict prior to submission, thus obvi-
ating the need for charging upon the law. The third ground asserts
the novel proposition that no special verdict should be submitted to
the jury which contains conclusions of law. This reasoning is bas-
ed upon the statute which states that the jury shall find the "facts
only" (emphasis added), and the Gendier case. This is a new
thought in special verdicts because ever since Noseda v. Demul the
practice has been to disregard conclusions of law if sufficient other
facts are found to sustain judgment.
The Landon case was certified as being in conflict with Wills V.
Anchor Cartage and Storage Co.50 The Wills case held that a special
verdict which failed to find upon the issues of negligence and proxi-
mate cause was insufficient. It is believed that the result reached by
the court of appeals in the Landon case is supported by the better
authorities and that the court of appeals should be affirmed, and
Wills v. Anchor Cartage and Storage disapproved.
4 9 Klarnan v. Snyder Trucking Co., supra.
50 Wills v. Anchor Cartage & Storage Co., 38 Ohio App. 358, 176 N._ 680
(1931).
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